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Abstract
There has been a substantial amount of public discussion on the health effects
of the use of depleted uranium (DU) munitions. In response to this concern
the Royal Society set up an independent, expert working group to investigate
the health effects of DU munitions. The Royal Society has now produced two
reports, and this summary covering the key conclusions and recommendations
from both reports. The part I report considered the increased risks of radiation-
induced cancer from exposures to DU on the battleﬁeld. Part II dealt with the
risks from the chemical toxicity of uranium, non-malignant radiation effects
fromDUintakes,thelong-termenvironmentalconsequencesofthedeployment
of DU munitions and responses to part I including issues arising at a public
meeting to discuss the part I report.
The concerns
Munitions containing penetrator rods of depleted uranium (DU) are used on the battleﬁeld
to destroy heavily armoured vehicles. These munitions contain no explosive charge but the
extremely dense DU rod, travelling at high speed, is able to pierce the heavy armour of a
modern battle tank. About 340 tonnes of DU were used in munitions during the 1991 Gulf
War, and an estimated 11 tonnes in the Balkans in the late 1990s.
Concerns have arisen as DU is a chemically toxic and weakly radioactive substance. Its
use on the battleﬁeld can lead to it being spread over a wide area, with potentially hazardous
consequencesforthoseonthebattleﬁeldduringorshortlyafteranengagement,forthoseliving
or returning to live in the area and for the environment generally. This is additional, of course,
to the obvious dangers faced by those inside a vehicle struck by a DU munition.
The military use of DU has therefore generated considerable public controversy, and
various claims have been made about the dangers associated with it. The Royal Society
thereforeconvenedanindependentexpertworkinggrouptoreviewthepresentstateofscientiﬁc
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knowledge on the subject. The group has produced two very detailed scientiﬁc reports, which
have been published and are also available on the web1. The two reports are: The Health
Effects of DU Part I (likely exposure levels, radiological effects, epidemiology), May 2001
and Part II (effects from chemical toxicity, environmental impact and responses to part I),
March 2002. The membership of the working group is given at the end of this document. This
summary brings together the key points from both reports. It should be stressed that neither
report considers whether DU munitions should or should not be deployed, the military merits
ofDUmunitionsorthephenomenonofGulfWarSyndrome. TheCounciloftheRoyalSociety
has endorsed both the reports and this summary of them.
The working group examined the extensive scientiﬁc literature relevant to the subject
and consulted widely among all those with an interest, including those with direct
personal experience of DU and DU munitions and those with relevant scientiﬁc expertise.
Correspondence with interested parties has continued throughout the study. After publication
ofitsﬁrstreport,thegroupconvenedapublicmeetingwhereapanelcomprisingtheChairman,
theChiefScientiﬁcAdviserattheMinistryofDefence,theChiefScientiﬁcAdvisertotheGulf
Veterans Association and a representative of the Low Level Radiation Campaign commented
on the report’s conclusions and responded to questions from the audience of about 80.2 This
summary also addresses the key points arising from that public meeting.
Health effects
(i) Radiological effects. The three main routes of human exposure to DU on the battleﬁeld
are inhalation, ingestion and wounding. On impact with an armoured vehicle substantial
amounts of DU may be dispersed as particles that can be inhaled and DU fragments may cause
shrapnel wounds. Due to the lack of measurements of actual levels, our approach has been
to estimate the typical levels of exposure on the battleﬁeld over a wide range of scenarios,
and the worst-case exposures that are unlikely to be exceeded. From these we calculated the
potentialhealthrisksfromradiationandtoxiceffects. Wehavealsoconsideredrelevantanimal
studies and epidemiological studies of occupational exposures to uranium in other situations
as an independent source of information on the risks of inhaling DU particles, although we
recognise that the parallels may not be precise.
There are still uncertainties that need to be resolved, particularly in the estimates of DU
intakes that could occur in different situations on the battleﬁeld. Most of these uncertainties
arise as a consequence of the lack of good experimental data on the amounts of DU that may
beinhaledwithinandclosetotanksstruckbyaDUpenetrator, andthealmostcompletelackof
any measurements of DU in urine samples taken soon after exposure to a DU impact aerosol.
Despitetheseuncertainties,itispossibletosetreasonableupperandlowerlimitsontheintakes
and subsequent health effects of DU on the battleﬁeld.
The greatest exposure to radiation resulting from inhaled DU particles will be to the
lungs and associated lymph nodes, and an increased risk of lung cancer is considered to
be the main radiation risk. Using worst-case assumptions the predicted radiation doses to
the thoracic lymph nodes are about ten times higher than those to the lungs, but the risks
of cancer of the lymphatic system are considered to be much lower as the thoracic lymph
nodes are more resistant to radiation-induced cancers than the lungs, although this view has
1 Parts I and II are available in printed form at £17.50 each; orders should be sent to Jacqueline Knapp, The Royal
Society, 6–9 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1 5AG, UK; telephone 020 7451 2645; e-mail sales@royalsoc.ac.uk.
Electroniccopiesofthereportsandtheirtechnicalannexescanbealsofoundonthewebatwww.royalsoc.ac.uk/policy.
2 A summary of the public meeting can be found on the Royal Society website (http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/events/
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been challenged by some. The central estimate is intended to be representative of the average
individual in a group. The central estimate of the excess risk of fatal lung cancer was about
one in a thousand for any soldier receiving a large intake (e.g. surviving in a struck tank) and
was about one in 40000, or less, for other scenarios. This compares with the lifetime risk of
fatal lung cancer in the general population of about one in 250 for non-smokers and one in six
for cigarette smokers. Central estimates of risks of other cancers, including leukaemia, were
lowerthanthoseforlungcancerforallDUexposurescenarios. Underworst-caseassumptions
the excess risk of fatal lung cancer for the most heavily exposed soldier could be about one
in 15.
Oneissueraisedatthepublicmeetingwasthepossibilityofeffectsontheimmunesystem
from inhaling DU particles. Effects on components of the immune system have been observed
in humans and animals exposed to large intakes of radioisotopes that irradiate the red bone
marrow. The levels of irradiation of the red bone marrow for all DU exposure scenarios
are predicted to be less than those from background sources, except for a soldier receiving a
very large intake under worst-case assumptions, where they could be considerably higher than
background levels, but would probably still be too low to cause effects on the immune system
that would increase susceptibility to infection.
(ii) Chemical toxicity. It is well established from animal studies, and there is supporting
evidence from human exposures, that the kidney is the organ most susceptible to the toxic
effects of uranium. A large body of literature exists about the toxic effects of inhaled, ingested
and injected uranium compounds on laboratory animals. However, there are large differences
in the susceptibilities of animal species to uranium, which make it difﬁcult to use the animal
data to estimate the intakes of uranium that have adverse effects in humans.
There are few studies of humans exposed to substantial intakes of uranium and hence
the concentrations of uranium in the kidney that lead to serious adverse effects are not well
documented. Veryfewhumanshavehadsufﬁcientlylargeacuteintakesofuraniumcompounds
to lead to severe kidney dysfunction or kidney failure. Studies of these few cases indicate that
kidneyfailureislikelytooccurwithinafewdaysatconcentrationsaboveabout50µguranium
per gram kidney.
The levels of kidney uranium for extended periods of time that lead to minor kidney
dysfunction in humans (measurable by sensitive biochemical tests of kidney function) are not
well established, but are considered to be at least tenfold less than the value of 3 µg uranium
per gram kidney that has often been used as the basis for occupational exposure limits. Acute,
or short-term, exposures that lead to concentrations of about 1 µg uranium per gram kidney
have been associated with minor kidney dysfunction, but the levels of kidney uranium that can
occur for a short period without causing long-term adverse effects on the kidney have not been
deﬁned.
Theavailableevidencesuggeststhatthereislittle,ifany,increaseinkidneydiseaseamong
workers involved in the processing of uranium ores or in uranium fabrication plants. However,
this is not necessarily reassuring since the daily intakes that occurred from chronic inhalation
exposuretouraniumparticlesintheseindustrieswouldtypicallyhavebeenmuchlowerthanthe
acute intakes that could be received by the most heavily exposed soldiers in a military conﬂict.
Also, the typical forms of the inhaled particles in industrial settings and on the battleﬁeld will
be different, and these alternative forms might not have the same adverse effects.
The kidney is a resilient organ and in a young adult about two-thirds of kidney function
canbeimpairedwithoutobviousclinicalsignsofdisease. Similarly, apparentlynormalkidney
functioncanberestoredevenafteralargeacuteintakeofuranium. Thisraisesdifﬁcultieswhen
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chance of lung cancer or kidney disease in later life, would probably not be apparent from a
clinical examination or from standard blood and urine analyses carried out several years after
exposure. Forthosewhomayhavebeenexposedatsometimeinthepasttosubstantialintakes
of DU an analysis of uranium isotopes in urine is required to assess intakes and the possibility
of any long-term health consequences.
From the estimated DU intakes for most soldiers on the battleﬁeld it is not expected
that adverse effects on the kidney would occur. Levels of uranium in the kidney of soldiers
survivingintanksstruckbyDUrounds,orofsoldiersworkingforprotractedperiodsinheavily
contaminated vehicles, could lead to some short-term kidney dysfunction, but whether this
would lead to any long-term adverse effects is unclear. According to worst-case assumptions,
kidney uranium levels in some soldiers could be very high, and would probably lead to kidney
failure within a few days of exposure, although we are unaware of any such cases of kidney
failure.
(iii) Other health effects. Large inhalation intakes of DU particles may result in short-term
respiratoryeffects, aswouldalargeintakeofanydust, butlong-termrespiratoryeffectsarenot
expected, exceptperhapsforthemostheavilyexposedsoldiers, underworst-caseassumptions,
where some ﬁbrosis of the lung could occur from radiation effects, in addition to an increased
risk of lung cancer.
Uranium is deposited in bone but there is insufﬁcient evidence to conclude whether large
intakes of DU on the battleﬁeld could have adverse effects on the bone.
There is recent evidence that uranium may directly damage genetic material and there is
a possibility of damage to DNA due to the chemical effects being enhanced by the effects of
the alpha-particle irradiation.
(iv)Otherevidence. ExtensiveevidencewastakenfromDrDougRokkewhowaspartofaunit
involved in assessing battleﬁeld damage after the Gulf War and in cleaning up allied and Iraqi
tanks after combat. Dr Rokke considers that for a number of reasons the intakes for soldiers
involved in these activities would have been substantially higher than we proposed. Some of
these claims conﬂict with those in military reports. Nevertheless, we have provided estimates
of DU intakes, and of the risks of cancer and adverse kidney effects, for these proposed levels
of exposure. If these very large exposures to DU are realistic, a small number of soldiers who
worked for very long periods cleaning up vehicles struck by DU munitions during the Gulf
War might have suffered adverse health effects, involving kidney damage and a substantial
increase in the risk of lung cancer.
Measurements of uranium isotopes in the urine of some veterans have been carried out in
Canada. In discussions with Dr Asaf Durakovic on this subject it became clear that there are
uncertainties about the reliability of these measurements of DU in urine, due to the absence of
anappropriatecontrolgroupandthedifﬁcultiesassociatedwithobtainingreliableisotoperatios
from samples of urine containing small amounts of uranium. However, reliable measurements
of DU in urine would be valuable even ten years after the Gulf War as they probably could still
provide an assessment of intakes and risks.
Environmental impact
AfteraconﬂictinwhichlargenumbersofDUmunitionsaredeployed, thosewhoreturntolive
in the area will be exposed to resuspended DU particles, and in some cases to contaminated
foodandwatersupplies. Wehavethereforeassessedthelong-termeffectsontheenvironment.
Contamination will occur mainly from DU particles and penetrator fragments deposited on
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Persian Gulf and the Balkans about 70–80% of all DU penetrators remain buried in the soil.
The movement of DU from these sources, and from deposited DU particles and fragments,
into susceptible components of the environment will depend on a number of factors, including
the rates of corrosion, which depend on soil properties, the amount of resuspension of soils
and the proximity of DU penetrators to surface soils, and water sources that feed into local
water supplies. These sorts of factors will also inﬂuence the extent of uptake of DU by plants
and intakes by food animals.
The levels of environmental contamination will be very variable, which makes it difﬁcult
to generalise about DU intakes. These levels could range from being so small that they do
not materially increase the concentration of uranium naturally present in the environment to
worst-case scenarios, such as the soil around a penetrator impact site, or a penetrator lodging
directly in contact with groundwater which could feed uranium directly into a local water
supply, such as a well.
Initially, exposure of the local population will be to DU particles resuspended from
contaminated soil, and from contaminated food, but the inhalation exposure and intakes from
food will decrease, and the proportion of exposure from intakes of DU from contaminated
water sources will increase. Estimates of intakes from DU particles resuspended from soil
suggest that they will not lead to a detectable increase in any cancer among those returning
to the conﬂict area, or among peace-keepers, although there are major uncertainties in the
estimates of inhalation intakes of DU in the years following a conﬂict. Intakes of DU from
contaminated food and water will be dependent on variations in the distribution of DU, local
soil conditions and human behaviour and site-speciﬁc assessments are required where there
are grounds for concern.
Measurements of environmental contamination in Kosovo have not shown widespread
contamination with DU although hot spots of contamination are present around penetrator
impacts. Contamination of soil at impact sites can lead to signiﬁcant exposure to DU,
particularly for children playing in the area and ingestion of heavily contaminated soil. Most
of the DU deployed in a military conﬂict remains in the ground and contamination of water
supplies is a concern in the longer term. Environmental movement of DU from buried
penetrators will be slow and monitoring of uranium contamination in water supplies therefore
needs to be carried out for many decades in areas where DU munitions were deployed.
Conclusions
Based on our own estimates of intakes of DU, we have drawn the following conclusions:
(a) Except in extreme circumstances, any extra risks of developing fatal cancers as a result
of radiation from internal exposure to DU arising from battleﬁeld conditions are likely to
be undetectable above the general risk of dying from cancer over a normal lifetime. This
remains true even if our estimates of risk resulting from likely exposures are 100 times
too low.
(b) The extreme circumstances will apply only to a very small fraction of the soldiers in a
theatre of war, for example those who survive in a vehicle struck by a DU penetrator, or
those involved in cleaning up struck vehicles. In such circumstances, and assuming the
most unfavourable conditions, the lifetime risk of death from lung cancer could be about
twice that in the general population.
(c) Any extra risks of death from leukaemia, or other cancers, as a result of exposure to DU
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all likely exposure scenarios the extra lifetime risks of fatal leukaemia are predicted to be
too small to be detectable.
(d) The radiological risks from the use of DU in munitions are for the most part low, but there
are uncertainties in the levels of exposure that could occur under unfavourable conditions,
and for small numbers of soldiers there could be circumstances in which the excess risks
of lung cancer are substantial. It is for this reason that further work should be undertaken
to clarify the extent of intakes on the battleﬁeld.
(e) The estimated DU intakes for most soldiers on the battleﬁeld are not expected to result in
concentrations of DU in the kidney that exceed 0.1 µg per gram kidney, even transiently.
Consequently, in these cases it is not expected that adverse effects on the kidney or any
other organ would occur.
(f) Levels of uranium in the kidney of soldiers surviving in tanks struck by DU rounds,
or of soldiers working for protracted periods in heavily contaminated vehicles, could
reach concentrations that lead to some short-term kidney dysfunction, but whether this
would lead to any long-term adverse effects is unclear as adequate studies of the long-
term effects on the kidney of acute or protracted exposures to elevated levels of uranium
are not available. According to worst-case assumptions, kidney uranium levels in some
soldiers could be very high, and would probably lead to kidney failure within a few days
of exposure. We are not aware of any cases of kidney failure, occurring within a few days
of exposure, in US soldiers who would have received the highest DU intakes during the
Gulf War, but we cannot rule out some kidney damage for such soldiers under worst-case
assumptions.
(g) For those returning to live in areas where DU munitions were deployed, including peace-
keepers, the inhalation intakes from resuspended DU are considered to be unlikely to
cause any substantial increase in lung cancer or any other cancers. The estimated excess
lifetime risk of fatal lung cancer is about one in a million, although there could be higher
risks for some individuals with worst-case intakes of DU due to higher levels of local
contamination. Estimated risks of other cancers are at least 100-fold lower. There are,
however, large uncertainties in the estimates of inhalation intakes in the years following a
conﬂict.
(h) No effects on kidney function from inhalation of resuspended DU are expected for most
individualswhoreturnafteraconﬂict. Smalleffectsonkidneyfunctionarepossibleusing
worst-case assumptions, but would at most only apply to a small number of individuals.
(i) Ingestion of DU in contaminated water and food, and from soil, will be highly variable
and may be signiﬁcant in some cases, e.g. children playing in areas where DU penetrators
have impacted, ingestion of heavily contaminated soil or where a buried penetrator feeds
uranium directly into a well. Environmental movement of DU from buried penetrators
into local water supplies is likely to be very slow and over a period of decades levels of
uranium could increase in some local water supplies.
Recommendations
Against the background of these conclusions we recommend the following long-term studies,
monitoring of health effects and further research.
Long-term studies:
• Long-term epidemiological studies of soldiers exposed to DU aerosols, or with retained
DU shrapnel, should be undertaken to detect any increased incidence of cancers, non-
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• Although there is no clear evidence that occupational exposures to uranium have
consequences for reproductive health, effects on reproductive health have been observed
in mice after high intakes of uranium. Accordingly, epidemiological studies of the
reproductive health of Gulf War veterans and of the Iraqi population are underway. If
effects are seen then further investigation would be required to estimate the relative
contributions from DU and from other possible causes.
• Long-term environmental sampling, particularly of water and milk, is required and
provides a cost-effective method of monitoring sensitive components of the environment,
and of providing information about uranium levels to concerned local populations.
Monitoring may need to be enhanced in some areas, by site-speciﬁc risk assessment,
if the situation warrants further consideration.
• Localised areas of DU contamination provide a risk, particularly to young children, and
areas should be cleared of visible penetrators and DU contamination removed from areas
around known penetrator impacts.
Monitoring of health effects:
• Any UK veterans with high level exposures should be identiﬁed, and invited to participate




of DU. This information is required to estimate radiation risks and also to estimate the
levels of uranium in the kidney and the likely effects on health from the chemical toxicity
ofuranium. AnystudiesofindividualswhomighthavereceivedsubstantialintakesofDU
must include the most modern sensitive biochemical methods to detect signs of kidney
dysfunction and should involve an expert nephrologist.
• There are reports that DU has been detected in the urine of some Gulf War veterans
but the reliability of the available measurements is subject to considerable uncertainty.
A carefully validated method for measuring uranium isotope ratios in urine containing
small amounts of uranium is required. These studies should be conducted at independent
laboratories with the collaboration of veterans’ groups. Such studies are being progressed
by the MOD’s DU Oversight Board.
• A small number of US veterans in the Gulf War worked for protracted periods in heavily
contaminatedvehicles,andsocouldhavereceivedlargeintakesofDU.Thereareanecdotal
reports of deaths and illness in these veterans and an independent study of mortality and
morbidity among them is required to examine possible causes.
• The risk of lung cancer from alpha-emitting particles in the lungs is well characterised but
the risk of lymphoid and haemopoietic cancers from alpha-particle irradiation of thoracic
lymph nodes is more controversial. A detailed review of the evidence concerning the
contribution of alpha-particle irradiation of the thoracic lymph nodes to the development
of lymphoid and haemopoietic cancers is warranted.
• Serious effects on the kidney and lung are possible under worst-case assumptions for a
few soldiers who could receive large acute exposures to DU on the battleﬁeld. Any case
of acute kidney failure occurring within a few weeks of exposure should be thoroughly
investigated to establish whether high kidney uranium levels could be the cause.
Further research:
• Better estimates of the levels of DU, and the properties of DU aerosols, resulting from
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include measurements of DU concentrations in air within and around struck tanks and
those arising from resuspension of DU-containing dust in contaminated vehicles.
• ModelsshouldbedevelopedandvalidatedtoenableDUexposurestobepredictedinawide
range of circumstances. When further modelling and experimental data are available new
independent assessments of the resultant risks, particularly from high exposures, should
be undertaken.
• AbetterunderstandingofthebehaviourofDUoxidesproducedduringpenetratorimpacts
and DU corrosion products is required. Applications of this include long-term studies of
invivodissolutionofDUoxidesandtheenvironmentalbehaviourofthecorrosionproducts
of DU–Ti alloys3 and particles relative to naturally occurring uranium minerals.
• Information should be obtained on the bioavailability of the DU–Ti products from DU
munitions and their corrosion products (particles, metallic fragments and secondary
precipitates associated with the corrosion process), and on whether bioconcentration of
these materials occurs in local food animals or plants.
R´ esum´ e
Un nombre important de discussions publiques ont ´ et´ e consacr´ ees aux effets sanitaires de
l’emploi de munitions ` a l’uranium appauvri (UA). Pour r´ epondre ` a ce souci, la Royal Society
a constitu´ e un groupe de travail form´ e d’experts ind´ ependants, pour rechercher quels sont
les effets sanitaires des munitions (UA). La Royal Society a ´ ecrit deux rapports; ce r´ esum´ e
regroupe les conclusions clefs et les recommandations de ces deux rapports. Le rapport
constituant la partie I consid` ere l’augmentation des risques de cancers radio-induits r´ esultant
de l’exposition au (UA) sur le champ de bataille. La partie II a trait aux risques venant de
la toxicit´ e chimique de l’uranium, aux effets ‘non malins’ du rayonnement venant de l’(UA)
ing´ er´ e; elle traite aussi de cons´ equences ` a long terme pour l’environnement du d´ eploiement de
munitions ` a l’(UA); elle r´ epond ` a la partie I et donne les conclusions d’une r´ eunion publique
consacr´ ee ` a discuter la partie I.
Zusammenfassung
Die gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen verbrauchter Uranmunition werden in der ¨ Offentlichkeit
intensiv diskutiert. Als Reaktion auf diese Sorge bildete die Royal Society eine
unabh¨ angige Arbeitsgruppe aus Sachverst¨ andigen zur Untersuchung der gesundheitlichen
Auswirkungen verbrauchter Uranmunition. Die Royal Society hat jetzt zwei Berichte erstellt,
sowie diesen ¨ Uberblick, der die wichtigsten Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen beider
Reports zusammenfasst. Teil I des Reports befasste sich mit den erh¨ ohten Risiken von
strahlenverursachtem Krebs durch Strahlenbelastungen aufgrund verbrauchter Uranmunition
auf dem Schlachtfeld. Teil II befasste sich mit den Risiken aufgrund der chemischen Toxizit¨ at
von Uran, nicht b¨ osartigen Strahlenauswirkungen in Folge der Aufnahme verbrauchter
Uranmunition, denlangfristigenUmweltfolgendesEinsatzesvonverbrauchterUranmunition,
sowie Reaktionen auf Teil I, einschließlich Fragen, die bei einer ¨ offentlichen Diskussion von
Teil I des Reports gestellt wurden.
3 The DU used in penetrators and armour is alloyed with 0.75% titanium. The corrosion properties of this alloy may
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